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Eternal Truth by Convention 
Eric J. Loomis, Mobile / Alabama 
Within the epistemology of the sciences, conventionalism 
has been the subject of regular criticism for over six 
decades. Critics such as W. V. Quine and Morton White, 
and more recently Nathan Salmon (1992), and Paul 
Boghossian (1996), have attacked even the most basic 
tenet of conventionalism, namely its claim that the truth of 
certain statements is fixed not by stipulation-independent 
facts, but by the conventions governing the meaning of 
those statements and their constituents.  
One such criticism has been recently leveled by Bog-
hossian, who argues that the conventionalist is in trouble 
when confronted with the truism that, “for any statement S, 
S is true iff for some p, S means that p and p.” After all, 
Boghossian argues, “How could the mere fact that S 
means that p make it the case that S is true? Doesn’t it 
also have to be the case that p?” (Boghossian 196, 365). 
The conventionalist will presumably answer by saying that 
p is the case in virtue of our meaning p by S. But then, 
Boghossian says, conventionalism looks seriously 
implausible, for it now seems that 
the truth of what the sentence expresses depends on 
the fact that it is expressed by that sentence, so that we 
can say that what is expressed wouldn’t have been true 
at all had it not been for the fact that it is expressed by 
that sentence. Are we really to suppose that, prior to our 
stipulating a meaning for the sentence 
Either snow is white or it isn’t 
it wasn’t the case that either snow was white or it 
wasn’t? (Boghossian 1996, 365) 
Boghossian's argument requires a bit of refinement. The 
conventionalist does not need to assert that if there had 
been no stipulations granting S a meaning, then not-p. 
Rather, she requires only a conditional of the form: if there 
had been no stipulations granting S a meaning, then S 
would be meaningless, and so would not mean that p. But 
even so, Boghossian is surely justified in pointing out that 
if a conventionalist thinks that geometrical axioms (see 
Poincaré 1952), spatial metrics (Schlick, 1985), or even 
physical laws (Carnap, 1937), are consequences of 
stipulations made at some particular time, then they ought 
to have some explanation of why those things appear to 
be true for all time. 
I wish to argue that Boghossian's objection is answer-
able from within a broadly conventionalist framework. My 
case will rest in part on an argument suggested by 
Wittgenstein, and it is consistent with the broadly conven-
tionalist epistemology of science that appears in Poincaré, 
Schlick, and Carnap. Such a conventionalist epistemology 
maintains that at least some statements of a scientific 
theory, such as geometrical, metrical, logical, or mathe-
matical principles, and possibly also physical laws, are 
themselves either explicitly or implicitly the expressions of 
linguistic rules, or the consequences of the adoption of 
linguistic rules. As expressions of linguistic rules, the 
conventional elements of a theory are held to be partially 
or wholly constitutive of the meaning of some of the 
theoretical terms that appear in them, such as "straight 
line", "simultaneous", "logical consequence", or "iron" (see 
for instance Carnap 1937, 180 and passim).  
Conventionalists differ about what types of statements 
are conventions, with some conventionalists, such as 
Poincaré, restricting conventions to the geometrical and 
metrical principles of a physical theory (see Poincaré, 
1952), while others, like Carnap, count even logical and 
physical laws among the possible conventions of a 
scientific theory. Conventionalists like Carnap recognize 
important differences among the types and scope of 
conventions, as with Carnap's distinction between P-rules 
and L-rules (Carnap 1937, 184). For my purposes, 
however, these distinctions are not important. What is 
important is that at least some of the physical principles 
that are claimed to be conventional appear to be timelessly 
true, in the sense that we expect them to be true at every 
time in the past, present, and future. So my reference to 
"physical principles" in this context is intended to be very 
broad and to encompass those statements of a physical 
theory, including geometrical, mathematical, and logical 
statements, which appear to be timelessly true. The 
conventionalist epistemologies of science in Poincaré, 
early Schlick, and Carnap all include at least some such 
statements, whether from geometry (Poincaré 1952, 
150f.), mathematics (Schlick, 1985, 31f.), or geometry, 
mathematics, logic, and physical science (cf. Carnap, 
1937, 51 and passim). As such, Boghossian's objection 
that conventionalism wrongly implies that statements like 
“Either snow is white or it isn’t” are not timelessly true 
applies in some form to all three philosophers, even if 
Boghossian's particular example (of a consequence of the 
law of the excluded middle) would not be relevant for a 
conventionalist like Poincaré. 
The conventionalist response to Boghossian that I 
propose is motivated by looking at the role of temporal 
predicates and certain counterfactual expressions as they 
function in the context of remarks concerning statements 
of physical principles. In cases where S is an expression 
held to be timelessly true, statements having a form like:  
(a) Prior to a stipulation of the meaning for S, the fact p 
that S expresses was still a fact. 
or,  
(b) Even if no one had ever stipulated a meaning for S, 
fact p that S expresses would still have obtained. 
evoke our assent, while statements having a form like: 
(c) Fact p that is expressed by S came into existence at 
precisely the moment that the meaning of S was stipu-
lated. 
seem ridiculous. This reaction lends support to the idea 
that certain facts expressed by statements of physical 
principle are reports of eternal and convention independ-
ent facts, as Boghossian thinks.  
However, I believe that our reaction to statements of 
these forms is instead an expression of the fact that 
temporal expressions have no conventionally defined 
function within the context of talk about statements of (at 
least some) physical principles. That is, I propose that 
temporal statements like “before,” “after,” “when,” “ever,” 
and “always” have no rule-defined application to expres-
sions of some physical principles. Thus expressions of 
physical principles or their consequences such as: “Either 




snow is white or it isn’t,” “The shortest distance between 
two points is an arc,” or “The coefficient of thermic 
expansion for iron is 0.000012 (in the appropriate units)”, 
are simply outside of the conceptual system of temporal 
expressions. As such, they do not describe any event, and 
so a fortiori they describe no event of infinite duration. Our 
rejection of the attribution of finite duration to the truth of 
certain physical principles is therefore more akin to our 
rejection of category mistakes, such as the ascription of 
color predicates to abstracta like thinking or freedom, than 
it is akin to our rejection of particular historical claims that 
we know to be false.  
Thus, to say that the fact expressed by a statement like 
“Either snow is white or it isn’t” is true prior to our stipulat-
ing a meaning for this statement is simply a slightly 
confusing way of saying that no sense has been defined 
for a statement like: “The statement ‘Either snow is white 
or it isn’t’ became true at time t”. Our recognition of the 
senselessness of such sentences is expressed by our 
assenting to statements with a form like (a) and (b) above. 
But we so assent not because we have identified some 
fact that is timelessly true, but rather because we implicitly 
realize that no rules have been laid down which license an 
application of expressions like “became true on... ”, or 
“ceased to be true when ...” to certain statements of 
physical principles.  
The sense in which physical principles may be time-
lessly true is thus a conceptual one, not a metaphysical 
one. This position is wholly consonant with that aspect of 
conventionalism which emphasizes that a part of what the 
stipulations of the conventions of a physical theory are 
doing is specifying a descriptive apparatus in terms of 
which descriptions of facts have a sense in the first place. 
Critics of conventionalism have tended to focus upon the 
arguments, prominent in Poincaré and Duhem, that 
conventionalism is required by the under-determination of 
physical or geometrical theories by empirical observation. 
But there is another, independent justification for conven-
tionalism in the observation that that any description of the 
empirical world presupposes a suitable descriptive 
language, such as a geometry, a metric, or a mathematics, 
and that in many cases there is no issue of offering a 
justification for that descriptive language, for the simple 
reason that the descriptive language is a precondition of 
justification (see for instance Schlick 1985, 337f. I think this 
is also the upshot of Carnap's attempt to dismiss founda-
tional questions in his 1937, 277ff). My claim that temporal 
predicates have not been defined over physical principles 
thus fits nicely with this aspect of conventionalism. 
Yet this claim is likely to appear to some to be seriously 
ad hoc nonetheless. Why, after all, do we have the 
conventions governing temporal expressions that we do? It 
might well seem that we have the rules governing temporal 
expressions that we do because it is a fact that some 
physical principles answer to eternal, language-independ-
ent facts. If the timelessness of the truth of certain physical 
principles is just a matter of convention, why couldn’t we 
simply change our conventions such that tomorrow it will 
be false that snow is white or it isn't? Boghossian raises a 
similar worry by asking: isn't it "the world" or "the facts" that 
generate the truth of any given class of statements? (1996, 
365) 
The basic objection here is that we have the conven-
tional rules that we do because the world is a certain way. 
That is, matters of non-conventional fact determine the 
range of admissible conventions. If this weren't true, the 
objection continues, then since conventions are just 
stipulated, nothing prevents the stipulation of intuitively 
implausible alternatives. The end result appears to be 
relativism about even the most basic physical principles. 
However, I think that such relativism can be avoided, and 
that an under-appreciated argument of Wittgenstein's 
blocks this relativism objection rather nicely.  
In the Philosophical Remarks, Wittgenstein wrote: 
If I could describe the point of grammatical conventions 
by saying they are made necessary by certain properties 
of the colors (say), then that would make the conven-
tions superfluous, since in that case I would be able to 
say precisely that which the conventions exclude my 
saying. (Wittgenstein 1975, 53) 
Someone who thinks that linguistic conventions have a 
justification in non-conventional matters of fact will 
suppose that a convention about colors is ultimately 
justified by the relevant facts. Here Wittgenstein is giving a 
counterargument to this supposition.  
I take his argument to work as follows. Suppose one 
tries to say that because of the language independent fact 
that no two colors can be predicated of the same point in 
space at the same time (for example), our language, by 
means of conventions in the form of linguistic rules, 
stipulates that at a single a time a particular point can be 
called “red” only if it cannot also be called “green.” One 
thus attempts to justify the rule by reference to a certain 
description of reality. But then the intelligibility of the 
description is presupposed by the rule-governed linguistic 
conventions which that description is supposed to be 
justifying. In other words, as Wittgenstein put it later,  
if something can be said in the justification and is 
permitted by its grammar -- why shouldn’t it also be 
permitted by the grammar that I am trying to justify? Why 
shouldn’t both forms of expression have the same 
freedom? And how could what the one says restrict what 
the other has to say? (Wittgenstein 1978, 186) 
If the justification cited as the ground for the claim that the 
conventions follow from the facts is intelligible, then, ex 
hypothesi, the statement of the justification accords with 
such conventions. But then there must already be a 
descriptive language in terms of which we frame our 
justifications for the constitutive rules of descriptive 
language. In which case both the conventions and their 
justification are superfluous; if we can already say what we 
need to in order to justify the conventions, we don’t need 
either the justification or the conventions.  
Wittgenstein can thus be read here as challenging the 
coherence of the supposition that there could be a 
justification for the conventions constitutive of a system of 
physical theory that appealed to facts described by using 
the conventions of that theory. Rather, the conventions 
that stipulate the meanings of certain physical concepts 
should not be regarded as themselves answerable to 
reports of facts involving those concepts. 




If this line of response to the relativism worry is accep-
ted, then I submit that the attempt to defend the timeless 
truth of certain physical principles by an appeal to the 
allegedly convention-independent fact that what those 
principles state is eternally true falls victim to this same 
circular reasoning. It is only given the conventions govern-
ing "not" and "or" that the sentence "Snow is white or it 
isn't" is an "eternal truth". Adducing the fact that snow is 
white or it isn't as a justification for the meaning-constitu-
tive conventions governing "not" and "or" illicitly uses a 
description of the allegedly justifying fact. The use is illicit 
since the required description is only intelligible in terms of 
the convention itself, and hence presupposes it. All of 
which exposes an incoherency in attempting to justify 
conventions in terms of facts in the way that the relativism 
objection assumes can be done. Conventionalism, I sub-
mit, has nothing to fear from the fact that certain truths are 
timeless, because this fact is itself a point about the use of 
language. 
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